3. december, 2010 | Blaž Zgaga

Pod budnim ameriškim očesom

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Združene države Amerike so menda ‘največji’ prijatelj Slovenije. Tako je dolga leta govoril bivši „večni” zunanji minister Dimitrij Rupel in vsi njegovi šefi. Toda prav v zadnjih dneh smo po objavi prvih depeš, ki so pricurljale na plan skozi spletno stran Wikileaks, lahko priče resni zadregi slovenske diplomacije, ki očitno klečeplazi pred ZDA, da bi dosegla 20-minutno srečanje z ameriškim predsednikom Barackom Obamo.

Laganje predsednika vlade Boruta Pahorja, da tisto, kar je v depeši zapisal ameriški odpravnik poslov  ne drži, in sprenevedanje zunanjega ministra Samuela Žbogarja, da je stisk rok in foto-termin predsednika vlade z ameriškim predsednikom lahko resen cilj diplomacije celotne države, sta zgovorna sami po sebi.

Vendar so stvari resnejše, kot si predstavlja večina državljanov Slovenije. Sinoči objavljena depeša v britanskem Guardianu namreč nazorno razkriva cilje zbiranja podatkov oziroma vohunjenja ameriških diplomatov v Sloveniji.

Po depeši ameriškega zunanjega ministrstva, ki je bila na veleposlaništvo v Ljubljani poslana 16. junija 2009, morajo diplomati zbirati celo biometrične, zdravstvene, finančne in druge podatke o sedanjih in prihodnjih slovenskih voditeljih in njihovih svetovalcih. Iščejo zlasti podatke o tem, kje bi lahko bili ranljivi.

Seznam ciljev zbiranja podatkov oziroma vohunjenja, ki naj bi ga opravljali ameriški diplomati, je zares obsežen. Zajema imena, delovna mesta, vse možne telefonske številke, telefonske imenike in imenike elektronske pošte, mnogo internetnih podatkov, številke kreditnih kartic, delovne urnike in praktično vse možne biografske podatke.

Gre za dejansko enak seznam vohunskih nalog, kot je tisti, ki so ga prejeli ameriški diplomati na sedežu Organizacije združenih narodov.

Področja, ki najbolj zanimajo ZDA, so naslednja:

Na področju mednarodnih odnosov in energetske varnosti jih najbolj zanimajo odnosi s sosednjimi državam, posebej s Hrvaško. Vendar Američane zanimajo tudi odnosi z Rusijo. Glede finančne stabilnosti in ekonomskega razvoja želijo čim več vedeti o opozicijskih, ekstremističnih in obrobnih skupinah, ki želijo izkoristiti ekonomsko krizo za doseganje svojih ciljev. In seveda odziv slovenske javnosti na finančne izzive.

Jasno, na področju nacionalne varnosti je na prvem mestu odnos Slovenije do zveze Nato. V poglavju nacionalno vodstvo in vladanje jih najbolj zanimajo cilji, strategije, avtoriteta in odgovornost  političnih voditeljev. V zadnjem, petem poglavju o telekomunikacijski infrastrukturi in informacijskih sistemih pa se zanimajo za pomanjkljivosti in luknje v sistemu. Verjetno zato, da bi lahko nemoteno ‘poslušali’ vsebino komunikacij.

Povsem na koncu depeše ameriškega zunanjega ministrstva, ki nosi podpis ‘Clinton’, je namreč jasno določeno, da naj diplomati pridobivajo službene in osebne telefonske številke, številke telefaksov in naslove elektronske pošte vodilnih civilnih in vojaških oseb v Sloveniji.

Seznam ciljev zbiranja podatkov oziroma vohunjenja je torej zelo obsežen.

Slovenija pa že ima precejšnje izkušnje pri obveščevalnem „sodelovanju“ z ZDA. Leta 1999 so vojaški obveščevalci rade volje in samovoljno predali Američanom kar svojo mrežo informatorjev v Srbiji in Črni Gori. Takrat, v aferi Sava, so slovenski vohuni prodajali svoje vire ameriškim agentom za nekaj sto mark ali dolarjev nagrade. Dobesedno za drobiž.

Zato ne gre dvomiti, da bi slovenski predsednik vlade Borut Pahor ali zunanji minister Samuel Žbogar rade volje ustregla Američanom pri pridobivanju podatkov. V zameno bi morda samovšečni premier dobil tako želeni stisk rok z Barackom Obamo pred kamerami in nekajminutni pogovor z njim. Slovenska diplomacija pa bi tako dosegla enega od svojih „strateških ciljev.“

Morda bi jim iskane podatke poklonil kar tako. Iz prijaznosti. Za goli nič. So what!

Blaž Zgaga

 


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  • Mr X je rekel/-la:

    Series: US embassy cables: the documentsPrevious | Next | Index US embassy cables: US diplomats in Slovenia asked to compile ‘biometric’ data on ‘current and emerging leaders and advisors’

    Share5 guardian.co.uk, Thursday 2 December 2010 19.40 GMT Article historyTuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:48
    S E C R E T STATE 062397
    NOFORN
    EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2034
    TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, SI
    SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: SLOVENIA
    REF: STATE 18774
    Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

    1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Slovenia (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Slovenia (paragraph 2).

    A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Slovenia and sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Slovenia. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

    B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

    C. (S/NF) Important information responsible to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

    2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Slovenia:

    A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting offiers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.

    B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Slovenia: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

    3. (S/NF) Slovenia NHCD outline — priority issues:

    A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security 1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 2) European Union (FPOL-4H) 3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H) 4) The United States (FPOL-4H) 5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H) 2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H) 3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) C. National Security 1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 4) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) D. National Leadership and Governance 1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H) 2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

    4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:

    A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security

    1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with regional neighbors, including Russia. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors, especially Croatia. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.

    2) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Details about formal and informal alliances between Slovenia and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.

    3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Slovenian dependence on Russian energy. Factors influencing government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Details about personal relations between Slovenian leaders and Russian leaders and businessmen. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.

    4) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.

    5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China, Iran, and nations that are hostile to US interests.

    B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges

    1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.

    2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.

    3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.

    C. National Security

    1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Slovenian soil, NATO commands in Slovenia, and out-of-country deployments of Slovenian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.

    2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Foreign use of Slovenia as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.

    3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.

    4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.

    5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Plans and efforts regarding Pan-European transport corridor. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.

    D. National Leadership and Governance

    1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Biographic, personality, health, biometric, financial, assessment, and vulnerability information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.

    2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to protect and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Indications of fraud or corruption in implementation of private property restitution policies. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems. Plans and efforts to combat intellectual property rights crime.

    3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.

    E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.

    CLINTON

  • Aljo je rekel/-la:

    Oooo a res, prav smešni ste z odkrivanjem tople vode, diplomacija deluje isto že tisočletja, samo tehnologija je druga.

    • Forestina je rekel/-la:

      eat this :)

      AMY GOODMAN: I’m going to interrupt, because I want to get to some memos that we’ve been getting from around the country that are very important and interesting. University students are being warned about WikiLeaks. An email from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, that we read in headlines, reads—I want to do it again—quote, “Hi students,

      “We received a call today from a SIPA alumnus who is working at the State Department. He asked us to pass along the following information to anyone who will be applying for jobs in the federal government, since all would require a background investigation and in some instances a security clearance.

      “The documents released during the past few months through Wikileaks are still considered classified documents. He recommends that you DO NOT post links to these documents nor make comments on social media sites such as Facebook or through Twitter. Engaging in these activities would call into question your ability to deal with confidential information, which is part of most positions with the federal government.

      “Regards, Office of Career Services.”

      That’s the email to Columbia University students at the School of International and Public Affairs.

      Now, I want to go on to another memo. Democracy Now! has obtained the text of a memo that’s been sent to employees at USAID. This is to thousands of employees, about reading the recently released WikiLeaks documents, and it comes from the Department of State. They have also warned their own employees. This memo reads, quote, “Any classified information that may have been unlawfully disclosed and released on the Wikileaks web site was not ‘declassified’ by an appopriate authority and therefore requires continued classification and protection as such from government personnel… Accessing the Wikileaks web site from any computer may be viewed as a violation of the SF-312 agreement… Any discussions concerning the legitimacy of any documents or whether or not they are classified must be conducted within controlled access areas (overseas) or within restricted areas (USAID/Washington)… The documents should not be viewed, downloaded, or stored on your USAID unclassified network computer or home computer; they should not be printed or retransmitted in any fashion.”

      That was the memo that went out to thousands of employees at USAID. The State Department has warned all their employees, you are not to access WikiLeaks, not only at the State Department, which they’ve blocked, by the way, WikiLeaks, but even on your home computers. Even if you’ve written a cable yourself, one of these cables that are in the trove of the documents, you cannot put your name in to see if that is one of the cables that has been released. This warning is going out throughout not only the government, as we see, but to prospective employees all over the country, even on their home computers. Steven Aftergood, your response?

      http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/3/is_wikileaks_julian_assange_a_hero

    • Forestina je rekel/-la:

      The documents should not be viewed, downloaded, or stored on your USAID unclassified network computer or home computer; they should not be printed or retransmitted in any fashion.”

      Adijo služba :)

    • Forestina je rekel/-la:

      10 000 000

      Kakšno kartoteko že mam, debelo :)

    • Forestina je rekel/-la:

      Udba je bila ppp , mini bikini, tole je pošast :)

    • Forestina je rekel/-la:

      http://www.therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=5968

      Gareth Porter, Investigative Journalist

      and

      Ray McGovern, Retired CIA Analyst discuss Wikileaks

  • Zbik je rekel/-la:

    Sorry - we haven’t been able to serve the page you asked for!

  • dado je rekel/-la:

    Koloradski hrošč tudi vohun je,
    bega me le,
    da zgaga tega še ne ve!

  • Vest je rekel/-la:

    @ Zbik: popravljeno

  • obama je rekel/-la:

    pol vejo tudi,kje k…a Turek in Vasiljka? Da nimajo posneto?

  • [...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Vest, Danijel (imamo). Danijel (imamo) said: Nova objavljena depeša razkriva, da imajo Ameriški diplomati v Sloveniji enake naloge nadzora… http://bit.ly/fv4hJ2 (via @vestpest) #fb [...]

  • wiiiiii je rekel/-la:

    Ameriški špijoni ugotavljajo, kako ubožec Pahor preživi s 3000 evri na mesec.

    (vse mu je pobrala Dimic Simona press)

  • Boris_j je rekel/-la:

    Najlepša hvala Julianu Assangeu, kjerkoli že je. Zdaj so pa žarometi usmerjeni v našega dragega Boruta, da vidimo kako bo speljal igro. Bo dober konformist ali pokončen človek? Američane že skrbi to da bi nam vohunili Kitajci in ne oni, kaj šele da bi kdo vohunil pri njih. Ni nepomembno tudi to, da je dobrešen del leve volilne baze že tradicionalno zainteresiran za bolj mednarodne in svetovne teme. In tale stvar niti nima tako majhne teže. Če se bo naša draga garnitura torej odvzala hlapčevsko in z gledanjem čez prste, si je morda zabila že svoj zadnji žebelj v krsti.

  • wiiiiii je rekel/-la:

    Najmanj kar bi morali storiti je to, da zunanji minister pokliče ameriškega veleposlanika na zagovor.

    haha…

    A se še kdo spominja, kako je Žbogar kot ambasador v Washingtonu vestno zapisoval, kako naj Slovenija vodi EU?

  • Neja je rekel/-la:

    Vseeno mislim, da so, tako na splošno, desni ali prefarbanci v desne večji “biciklisti”, bolj klečeplazni, da rečem, večji hlapci, kot levi. Desni, z Ruplom na čelu, so lezli v rit Američanom, Vatikanu. Pahor je bolj uravnotežen, leze v rit Američanom, Francozom, Nemcem, tudi malo Vatikanu, in pa Rusom. Mogoče je v resnici že bolj desni kot lev.?
    Ampak novinarji, ne mislim ravno tebe, Blaž, delajo in drobcev že afere. Svoje videnje prodajajo za čisto resnico. Na trhlih temeljih gradijo zgodbe, drugi jih nadgrajujejo naprej, in vse skupaj postane resničnost. Na žalost, resničnost za ljudstvo. Ljudje, jezni, obupani v teh kriznih časih, iščejo krivce. Novinarji, namesto, da bi pomagali, pisali preudarno, netijo požar. Upam, da ne bo preveč zagorelo in da ne bo Slovenija čisto upostošena.

    • jebiveter je rekel/-la:

      ….@ Neja…. kaj če bi šla raje v mercator pa v spar lahko greš tudi v hofer ali pa lidl , pa nam potem poročaj kje je bolj smiselno nakupovati zelenjavo, z veseljem ti bomo prisluhnili, politiko pa lepo pusti pri miru, o tej stvari pa nimaš nobenega pojma, samo smešiš se, ….

    • Neja je rekel/-la:

      Ojoj, hvala. Res nisem vedela. Kaj pa svoboda pisanja? Čeprav neumnega? Mogoče res nimam posebnega pojma o vseh umazanih političnih igricah, ki so tebi bližje? Imam pa kar nekaj pojma o človekovem značaju in silnicah, ki ga vodijo…..

  • Neja je rekel/-la:

    “Združene države Amerike so menda ‘največji’ prijatelj Slovenije. ” “Vendar so stvari resnejše, kot si predstavlja večina državljanov Slovenije. Sinoči objavljena depeša v britanskem Guardianu namreč nazorno razkriva cilje zbiranja podatkov oziroma vohunjenja ameriških diplomatov v Sloveniji.”

    No, Blaž, saj druga trditev, ki ni točna, ne izključuje prve. Pravi prijatelji se morajo dobro poznati, Zaželeno je vedeti, kako živijo, delajo, se vedejo, s kom se družijo, kako so pripravljeni sodelovati, pomagati, kaj načrtujejo, kako so bogati, kako so zanesljivi in pošteni. In ti praviš, da vohunijo? Ne vidiš, da gre za pravo prijateljsko gesto in željo, da bi pomagali, če bi bila pomoč potrebna? Škoda je samo to, da jim naši v Ameriki tega ne vračajo v enaki meri.

    • jebiveter je rekel/-la:

      @ Neja….kot vidim ignoriraš mercator…..tam talajo dvojne pike….čimprej z vrečko k sosedu…

    • partizan je rekel/-la:

      Neja,

      Očitno ne poznaš razlike med diplomacijo in obveščevalno dejavnostjo.

      Diplomati zbirajo javno dostopne podatke. Vohuni pa jih zbirajo na ilegalen način. To, kar piše v originalni depeši State Departmenta so naloge za vohunsko zbiranje podatkov.

      Razliko o tem opredeli tudi dunajska konvencija o diplomatskih odnosih.

    • Neja je rekel/-la:

      Partizan, ne vidiš, da se iz vsega norčujem? Ne morem pomagati, ampak vse skupaj se mi zdi tako bedno.

    • partizan je rekel/-la:

      No,

      če se norčuješ, potem pa ti je uspelo! :-)

      Sem že resno pomislil, da resno misliš…

      To, kar razkrivajo depeše je namreč navadna špijonaža.

      Ampak hlapčevska Slovenija nikakor ne bo reagirala proti gospodarju, kot je zgoraj že nakazal Zgaga.

    • MEFISTO je rekel/-la:

      Skušala se je pač nekako izvleči.

    • Neja je rekel/-la:

      A si mogoče mislil name? Postani malo bolj občutljiv za ironijo, pa boš vedel, kaj je res.

    • WHMH je rekel/-la:

      Neja ni samo zelo zabavna, temveč tudi zelo pametna. V njenih očeh seveda …

  • Forestina je rekel/-la:

    Zastrupljajo vodo, Drni Rak, Račan rak, … do Casro, Rugova, Arafat. Kirchner ….

    Blackwater so morilci v službi Matrike

  • zorge je rekel/-la:

    Blaž, ti, ki imaš veze.Naj objavijo številke bančnih računov naših orožarjev in kam so denar nalagali.Sicer pa zgleda, da imajo vse pokrito in to kar pišem že sproti berejo.

  • martin je rekel/-la:

    V Nemčiji so takoj odstranili šefa kabineta zunanjega ministra, ki je vohunil za Američane, v Sloveniji pa so še veseli, da ZDA vohunijo za nami.

    Pravi hlapci! Cankar se verjetno obrača v grobu, ker ni našel bolj močnejših in primernejših besed…

  • angie je rekel/-la:

    Menda je največ od cca 250 depeš iz Slovenije iz obdobja Janševe vlade.
    Komaj čakam to branje! Da vidimo, kako je Dimski lezel v rit Bushu (prosto po današnji naslovnici Mladine).

    Zgaga, vprašaj svoje frende na Guardianu, če nam jih posredujejo. Danes jim je menda uspelo preko twitterja opraviti celo kratek intervju s preganjanim Assangeom!

    • zorge je rekel/-la:

      Kakšno rit neki angie, z velimi zamahi se je pognal po dvanajsterniku.

    • Neja je rekel/-la:

      Pa kako se je JJ poljubljal z Grmom. Zanima me, kaj je včeraj ameriški veleposlanik delal pri Ivanu. Morda ga je pripravljal na vsebino depeš?

    • konec je rekel/-la:

      rdeči prostitut se veseli, kot vsak anti-demokrat je v tem trenutku vesel, še enkrat več je dokazano, da je demokracija za manjšino, tako je bilo, je in bo…….za demokracijo so zreli le določeni predeli sveta…ostali naj imajo te ali oni “čistokrvne” in vsevede prostitute……ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha,

    • jebiveter je rekel/-la:

      …..kaj kvasi ta ženska, če se ona poljublja z štaubzaugerjem ( sesalcem ) misli, da se j z grmom ali za grmom…..razloži prosim…

    • martin je rekel/-la:

      @jebiveter

      kaj dobiš, ko prevedeš slovensko besedo “grm” v angleščino?

      ;-)

    • jebiveter je rekel/-la:

      ….pa misliš , da ženska zna angl. …..za tebe…..buš…..

    • martin je rekel/-la:

      to je po karađićevo - “piši kao što govoriš”.

      Bolj razumljivo je v originalu: :)

      B-U-S-H

  • martin je rekel/-la:

    Assangea ne lovijo, ker naj bi poslili dve ženski, ampak zato, ker so seksalI BREZ KONDOMA!

    In naj še kdo reče, da ga ne lovi CIA?

    http://www.fastcompany.com/1707146/wikileaks-assange-wanted-for-sex-by-surprise-but-the-internet-thinks-hes-a-rapist

  • konec je rekel/-la:

    rdeči prostitut se veseli, kot vsak anti-demokrat je v tem trenutku vesel, še enkrat več je dokazano, da je demokracija za manjšino, tako je bilo, je in bo…….za demokracijo so zreli le določeni predeli sveta…ostali naj imajo te ali oni “čistokrvne” in vsevede prostitute……ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha,

    • mujo je rekel/-la:

      @konec,

      z razkritjem svinjarij, ki jih delajo tvoji desničarji, republikanci, kriminalne korporacije in ruska mafija, je vesel ves svobodni svet!

      komaj čakamo na depeše, kjer bo obelodanjen tvoj idol in veliki vodja Janez Janša! hehe

    • WHMH je rekel/-la:

      mujo, kdaj se boš pa ti skril v luknjo ?

  • WHMH je rekel/-la:

    Blaž, a ti še dihaš …

  • Ivan je rekel/-la:

    Vse znano in lahko rečemo legitimno za diplomacijo. Ni problem ali oni vohunijo, problem je ali se mi uspešno ščitimo. In dokazano se ne ščitimo, se ne znamo ščititi in zaradi notranjepolitičnih zdrah sprejemamo dokumente o nacionalni varnosti, ki ne omogočajo organiziranje uspešne zaščite.

  • marsovec je rekel/-la:

    Spomnite se le afere Sava, ko so leta 2000 po ukazu Amerike kriminalisti delali hišno preiskavo pri Zgagi in ga hoteli zapreti za pet let.

    Kdo je bil takrat na oblasti v Sloveniji. Bajukova vlada z obrambnim ministrom Janezem Janšo! ;-)

    Bolj pohlevne in lizunske voditelje, kot so slovenski, je na svetu že težko najti.

  • nemesis je rekel/-la:

    Jelinčič ves čas govori,ne o diplomatih,ampak o tujih obveščevalnih službah,ki po njegovo vedo vse,kar se v državi dogaja,naj bi imeli celo fotografije dogodka Baričevič itd. in da izsiljujejo naše politike s takimi dokazi.

  • Forestina je rekel/-la:

    http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/3/is_wikileaks_julian_assange_a_hero

    Glenn Greenwald, a constitutional law attorney and legal blogger for Salon.com.

  • binebone je rekel/-la:

    Folk. Važn je da Washigtonovci že obvladujejo celo srednjo Evropo, ko so prevzeli nadzor nad Kosovom. Glavni cilj Washingtonovcev in neverjetno kopičenje orožja in vojaške moči za nadzor nad potencionalnimi tekmeci na evrazijski celini, še zlasti nad Rusijo in Kitajsko. V Gruziji so se Washingtonovci opekli in so moral stisniti rep med noge. Putin pa jim je zaplenil še dodatnega orožja in tehnologije za vohunjenje. Naslednej kar močno srbi gusarje iz Washingtona je Veliki tektonski jarek Sudan v Afriki (Great Rift Valley) ki skriva največje koncentracijo naravnih surovin na svetu. Tam se bo kmalu začela vojna. Washingtonovci bodo poskušal to pokrasti. In tako pridemo da glavne tarče Kitajske…

  • binebone je rekel/-la:

    Washigtonovci so si z novimi oporišči v srednji Aziji in na Bližnjem vzhodu zagotovili možnosti napada globoko na ozemlju Rusije in Kitajske. Washingtonova vojska je preko družbe Cheneya Halliburton po letu 2001 postavila v centralni Aziji in na Bližnjem vzhodu devetnajst novih oporišč, od tega štirinajst večjih in manjših letalskih oporišč v Afganistanu. Dve največji v Bagramu in Shindandu, ki služita kot vsestranski vojaški oporišči s sistemi za nadzor zračnega prometa po vsej Evraziji od Kitajske do Rusije. Afganistan je postal ogromna kopenska letalonosilka. In tako so Washingtonovci pod pretvezo terorizma tam namestili velikanski vojaški in organizacijski ustroj, ki napoveduje tam stalno prisotnost Washingtonovcev in zveze Nato na tem območju. In tako, kdo še verjame pravljici o terorizmu in da v Afganistanu Washigtonovci tam iščejo Bin Ladna. Malo morgen. Washigtonovci bodo kmalu začeli militarizirati ZDA.

    • marsovec je rekel/-la:

      samo vodo in bencin jim odklopijo, pa bomo gledali kak film o maršu žejnih vojakov čez puščave ;-)

  • binebone je rekel/-la:

    Negdajni vodja kabineta senatorja Boba Dola, Stanley Hilton je zadaj odvetnik v Washingtonu in zastopa družine žrtev napadov 11. septembra 2001. Predsednika Busha toži zaradi vpletenosti v dogotke 10. septembra 2004. je v pogovoru z znanim radijskim voditeljem Alexsom Jonesom izjavil: Tožimo Busha, Candoleezzo Rice, Cheneya, Rumsfelda, šefa FBI Muellerja, ker so prepričani, da so soodgovorni ne le za, ker niso preprečili, da bi se to zgodilo, temveč da so napade ukazali…vrasta dokazov, ki sem jih zbral v letu in pol, je tako očitnih, da lahko brez vsakega dvoma trdim, da je šlo za vladno operacijo, ki predstavlja največjo izdajo in množični pokol v aameriški zgodovini.
    Torej, Hilton je prepričan, da so bila vsa štiri letala ‘vodena na daljavo’.
    Takole je pojasnil: Kot sem povedal že pred letom in pol, obstaja sistem Cvclops. V kljunu letala je računalniški čip, ki zemeljski kontroli omogoča, da pilotu letala odvzame nadzor in letalo usmeri natančno proti cilju. Samo on ne bo nikoli zmagal proti taki bandi!
    No, sedaj je postalo jasno zakaj je strmoglavil poljski avijon z celotno poljsko vlado.
    Za take torej ne bo dovolj samo odklop vode in bencina.

  • Ivan je rekel/-la:

    Afganistan je res “letalonosilka” toda brez oskrbe preko zračnega in kopenskega mosta skozi Rusijo bi slabo plavala. Ameriška oporošča v AFG so tako varna, da si ne upajo predsednika prepeljati iz enega na drugega. Kaj je zadelo dvojčka vemo, ker je snemalna tehnika bila pripravljena, da smo vsi videli Boeinge. Toda Pentagon je nekaj drugega. Tako nizko ga zaradi okoliških zgradb ni moglo zadeti širokotrupno letalo (tudi s posebni vodenjem ne), lahko pa ga je zadel in napravil takšno škodo Tomahawk. Čez čas bomo morda izvedeli komu najbolj škoduje odkrivanje diplomatskih dokumentov. Informacija FBI, da je dostop do njih omogočil nekakšen bivši vojaček, ki so ga takoj odkrili in prijeli vzbuja pomisleke..