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Forestina je rekel/-la:

Mala teorija zarote o Dimičevi in Radićevi

http://www.dnevnik.si/debate/kolumne/1042397618

Forestina je rekel/-la:

Evo udbo dnevnik :) Začetek je.

Just how automatic the response could be was clear in the killing of Italian
security agent Nicola Calipari and the wounding of Italian journalist Giuliana
Sgrena on the evening of March 4, 2005, when a gunner from the U.S. Army’s
1-69th Infantry Battalion opened fire on the Italians’ car as it approached a
roadblock at an access ramp onto the main highway to Baghdad International
Airport. Known as ‘‘Route Irish,’’ the thoroughfare had seen numerous IED and
car bomb attacks, and the commander of the unit said that ‘‘force protection
was paramount in his mind’’ (U.S. DOD 2005:19). Poor communications and
bad weather contributed to the incident. But so did the design of the roadblock
and the ROE in force. The 1-69th did not have a written protocol for executing
blocking positions as they did for checkpoints, though the unit had practiced
roadblocks and had carried out similar missions before. The ROE were a rough
translation of the 5 S’s: ‘‘Shout, that is, use the spotlight on an approaching
vehicle as far in advance of the Alert Line as possible; Show, that is, use the
green laser light, aimed at the driver, at the Alert Line; Shove, that is, fire warning
shots; and Shoot, that is, disabling shots first, then, if necessary, shoot to
kill’’ (U.S. DOD 2005:20).
An Italian government report on the Calipari killing stressed the inexperience
of the U.S. troops at the roadblock and surmised that ‘‘some of the soldiers
made instinctive and barely controlled reactions’’ (Arie 2005). But all indications
are that the unit used a form of graduated force and that the shooter, Specialist
Mario Lozano, a National Guardsman from New York, followed the ROE. Seated
in the turret of a humvee with a M240 machine gun, Specialist Lozano was to
shine the hand-held spotlight toward the oncoming vehicle and, if necessary,
drop the light, lift his weapon, and ‘‘engage the threat with well-aimed fire using
both hands’’ (U.S. DOD 2005:18). The necessity of firing went unquestioned. So
did the idea of using lethal force at roadblocks in the first place, when physical
barriers alone might block the flow of traffic. Specialist Lozano’s judgment call
was fairly straightforward. If the vehicle reached the warning line without slowing
down, he would open fire and the risks of the encounter would be borne by the
inhabitants of the oncoming car. The Calipari case is highly unusual in one
respect: an Italian prosecutor charged Lozano with murder (citing lack of jurisdiction,
a judge dismissed the charges in October 2007). But the underlying
causes of the shootings had less to do with Specialist Lozano then they did with
the poor design and inadequate illumination of the blocking point. There were
no road signs or lights on the approach. The unit’s warning signs were in
storage at the time; the investigator noted that ‘‘there is no requirement for
signs, only a suggestion’’ (U.S. DOD 2005:16). The Italian report estimated that
3 seconds elapsed between the warning signals and the time the gunner opened
fire. Eleven bullets struck the car, rendering the distinction between disabling
shots and lethal shots slim indeed. The Army investigator recommended better
tactical training that distinguished between checkpoints and roadblocks, as well
as other, non-lethal ways to engage oncoming vehicles, noting that ‘‘while effective
for accomplishing the mission, the spotlight and laser pointer may not be
the best system from a civilian point of view’’ (U.S. DOD 2005:35).

MEFISTO je rekel/-la:

Forestina po svoji stari navadi spet odvrača pozornost od teme , tokrat od grobarja slovenskih financ.